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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JoHN E. nic~AUGHTON and HENRIETTA 
~IcNAUGHTON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
JOHN B. EATON, an unmarried man; 
MYRTLE Ross; JAMES H. FISHER and 
CuNA FISHER, husband and wife; 
RICE CooPER and EDITH R. LAw-
RENCE CooPER, husband and wife; 
LEE MURRAY and THEDA MuRRAY, 
husband and wife; W. S. Ross; and 
FERN Ross FAwcETT, 
Defendants and .Apcp-ellants. 
Case No. 7646 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs, John E. 
MeN a ugh ton and Henrietta E. MeN aughton, his wife, 
against the ~defendants to quiet title in plaintiffs to the 
water of a gulch commonly known as McN'aughton Gulch 
running in a Southeasterly direction across plaintiffs' 
property situated in Uintah County, State of Utah. 
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Plaintiffs base their claim on prior appropriation of 
the waters of McNaughton· Gulch flowing 1above and to 
an alleged permanent dam located midway in plaintiffs' 
property on the West line of the Northeast quarter of 
the Southwest quarter of Section 21, Township 4 South, 
Range 21 East, Salt Lake Meridian. (R. 26) 
To the Amended Complaint the defendants filed an 
Answer in which they denied generally the allegations 
of the Complaint and asserted that they were the owners 
of all waters flowing in the McNaughton Gulch, the same 
having been adjudicated to them and their predecessors 
in interest in 1920 in an action wherein Thom1as Mantle 
et al were plaintiffs and John B. Eaton et al were de-
fendants, Civil Case No. 960, Uintah County, Utah, 
which rights were prior and superior to any right claimed 
by the plaintiffs and that defendants further cl1aim said 
waters by virtue of prior appropriation. (R. 38-39) 
There were no further pleadings filed and upon the 
issues thus raised a trial was had to the court, sitting 
without a jury, and on the 9th day of .September, 1950, 
the trial court made and entered its Memorandum Deci-
sion (R. 48-65) and upon the 26th day of October, 1950, 
signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree, and the same were filed ·October· 30, 1950. (R. 
66-73) 
By its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Decree, the trial court found against defendants 
and ~awarded the water in controversy to the plaintiffs. 
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In its Memorandum Decision, the. court .he~d that both 
parties to this cause had taken the· position that· the 
waters_ in question "'"ere public "'"aters .and sul;>:ject to 
appropriation, each claiming "the right to their use by 
diYersion and application to beneficial use during .the 
period "~hen such processes were all that were required to 
effect lawful appropriation.'' (R .. 50.) 
After making· this observatio~,. ho~ever, .the court 
determined the case on the th,eory that th~ waters were 
' . 
not public waters but were diffused, seepage and per-
colating '\Yaters not subject to a.ppropri~tion. (R .. 50, 54, 
65) 
The defen·dants then filed a motion for a new trial 
upon the grounds that both plaintiffs and defend~~ts had 
prosecuted the case _on the, theory that the· waters in-
volved were public waters subject to a'ppropriation and 
for that, reason defendants did not submit evidence on 
. . . 
that :point and requested· permission to pres~nt evidence 
showing such waters to be pub~ic water~ and ~n the 
further ground that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree we're not supported by the evidence. 
(R. 75) ·This motion was denied by the Court. (R. 82) 
The defendants jointly and severally p-rosecute this 
appeal froni the Decree entered against them ·on both 
questions of law and of fact. (R. 83) 
The following statements of fact are established 
without conflict in the evidence: 
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The plaintiffs own land referred to in the record 
as the ''East 40'' and the ''West 40'' and which is 
particularly described in their Amended Complaint. 
There is a wash or gulch, know as MeN aughton Gulch, 
which heads at a considerable distance Northwest from 
plaintiffs' land and which crosses plaintiffs' property 
running in a Southeasterly direction as shown on Def. 
Exh. No. 1 and Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, extending beyond 
plaintiffs' lands into and across and beyond lands of 
some of the defendants. Where the gulch ends does not 
appear from the record. It has existed from time im-
memorial with well defined course, hank and stream bed. 
The trial court so found in its Memorandum Decision. 
(R. 48) 
In 1885 there was constructed an irrigation -canal 
known as the Ashley Upper Canal which crossed the Mc-
Naughton Gulch approximately a mile Northwest of 
plain tiffs' p-roperty. Beginning in 1886 the .portion of 
the gulch just below the canal was and still is used as a 
lateral of the Upper Canal system for a considerable 
distance down to the Carroll dam at which point all 
water in the gulch is diverted into what is referred to in 
the record as the Middle Ditch. (R. 48) 
The defendants divert water from the gulch in a 
series of three dams, the upper one being located on the 
plaintiffs' property just inside the East boundary and 
the other two being situated below and to the East of 
plaintiffs' property. See defendants' Exhibit 1. 
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This controversy arose over the waters arising from 
springs along the bank and bottom of the gulch and flow-
ing do,Yn the gulch, 'Yhich flow steadily increases froin 
approximately 1 C.F.S. in the distance of one mile from 
just inside the '':est boundary of the plaintiffs' land to 
from 3 to 7 C.F.S. (Tr. 64 and 126) flowing into the 
.Llshley Central Canal "There this canal crosses the gulch 
just below .. the diYersion points of the defendants. This 
flow is constant and year round and varies only as do 
other creeks and streams in response to wet or dry sea-
son. ( Tr. 22, 66, 67, 126). There is no evidence of sur-
face 'Yaste waters running into the gulch. The bottom 
and sides of the gulch are covered with water cress, suc-
culent grasses and willows, the former being indicative 
of a year round flow of clear, cold spring water. (Tr. 
291). The court so found in its Memorandum Decision. 
(R. 50) 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The defendants jointly and severally assign the fol-
lowing errors up·on which they, and each of them, rely for 
a reversal of the Decree and judgment 'appealed from 
and for the judgment of this court directing the trial 
court to make and enter judgment in favor of the de-
fendants and against the plaintiffs. 
POINT ONE 
That the trial court erred in deciding and disposing 
of the case on the theory that the waters involved were 
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diffused, waste, seepage and percolating waters and as 
such not subject to appropriation. 
POINT TWO 
That the trial court erred in denying defendants' 
motion to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing 
evidence showing that MeN a ugh ton Gulch is a natural 
water course, that the waters flowing therein are in a 
well-defined channel, flow constantly throughout the year, 
and are public waters subject to appropriation, as they 
were considered by both parties at the trial. 
POINT THREE 
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence over 
defendants' objection the Deposition of J. P. Rudy. 
(Tr. 225-6) 
POINT FOUR 
The trial co~rt erred in making numerous of its 
Findings of Fact in the following particulars: 
.a. The trial court erred in making ·that part of find-
ing numbered 4 wherein it found: "that s·aid gulch in its 
natural condition prior to· 1885 was dry and no water 
flowed therein.'' That such finding is based upon the 
testimony of one witness, John A. Gardner, (Tr. 8) 
which testimony was not ~onfined to any particular point 
on the gulch,· and which testimony was not material to 
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any issue in the case for the .reason; that both parties 
"~ere proceeding on the theory that McNaughton gulch 
"\Yas a natural water cours~. (R. 67) 
b. The trial court erred in making that part of 
finding numbered 5 "\vherein it found: ''that through the 
irrigation of these adjacent lands seepage and waste 
"\Vaters find their "\Yay by percolation, seepage ·and sur-
face run-off to the MeN a ugh ton Gulch.'' That there is 
no evidence in the record of surface waste water running 
into the gulch and that such finding is not supported 
by the· evidence. ( R. 68) 
c. The trial court erred in making that part of 
finding numbered 5 wherein it found: "that the amount 
of water thus finding its way into the McNaughton Gulch 
varies from day to day and from season to season, de-
pending upon the irrigation practices prevailing on these 
adjacent lands; that the amount of· water available for 
diversion from the gulch on to the McNaughton lands 
is not measurable; that in 1885 the .amount of land sur-
rounding the McNaughton Gulch which was, :being ir-
rigated was not sufficient to produce any showing of 
drainage water from that source, either surface or sub-
terranean, in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch." That such finding 
is contrary to the evidence and not supported thereby. 
(R. 68) 
d. The tial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered 6 wherein it found: "~h'at the volume 
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton 
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Gulch has increased with the increase irrigation within 
its drainage area, but the flow at its lowest ebb is of a 
negligible amount.'' That such finding is contrary to the 
clear preponderance of the evidence. ( R. 68) 
e. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered 6 wherein it found: ''and all of the water 
thus finding its way into the McNaughton Gulch has its 
origin originally in the Ashley Upper Canal.'' That 
this finding is not supported by the evidence. (R. 69) 
f. The trial court erred in making that p~art of find-
ing No. 8 where it found that the plaintiffs' predeces-
sors diverted water through one ditch running to the 
South and another ditch running to the North of said 
dam for the irrigation of the above described lands now 
owned by the plaintiffs.'' That such finding is without 
support in the evidence and is contrary to the clear .pre-
ponderance of the evidence. (R. 69) 
g. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered 9 wherein it found: ''That prior to 1900 
a network of ditches was constructed on the McNaughton 
properties described above from the Carroll Dam and the 
McNaughton Dam located near the Southeast corner of· 
the West 40 acre tract, which dam has been mentioned 
·above; that water could and can be diverted from the 
McNaughton Gulch and could and can be applied to all 
of the MeN a ugh ton lands described above, except ap-
proximately three acres in the Northwest corner of the 
West 40 !acre tract, and approximately four acres located 
South of the McNaughton Gulch on the West 40 acre 
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tract and the "Taters from the gulch have been used on 
said lands since the t":o dams referred to were first con-
structed.'' That such fiinding is contrary to the evidence. 
(R. 70) 
h. 'The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing nlunbered 11 wherein it found: "There is no evidence 
that any of these conditions (cresses, grasses ~and wil-
lo"Ts) pertained prior to 1886 before canal water was 
first applied in the drainage area, but the evidence is and 
the court finds that the gulch was dry prior to said time.'' 
That there is no evidence to support this finding. (R. 70) 
i. The trial court erred in making that part of find-
ing numbered 12 wherein it found: "that all of said 
dams used by the defendants to divert water from the 
J\ticNaughton Gulch were constructed after the dam 
maintained by the MeN aughtons near the Southeast 
corner of the West 40 acre tract.'' That such finding 
is without support in the evidence, and is contrary to the 
clear preponderance thereof. ( R. 71) 
POINT FIVE 
The trial court erred in making its conclusions of 
- law in the following particulars. 
a. The trial court erred in its conclusions of law 
contained in paragraph 1 thereof in so f~ar as it concludes: 
''That none of the defendants have any rights in any 
of the waters flowing in the McNaughton Gulch above 
the dam maintained by the MeN a ugh tons near the .South-
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e'ast corner of the West 40 acre tract, and they and each 
of them should be enjoined from attempting to divert 
or use said water or from claiming any right or owner-
ship thereto." That such conclusion of law is without 
support in either the evidence or findings of fact; and 
the same is contrary to law. (R. 71) 
b. The trial court erred in its conclusions of law 
contained in paragraph 2 thereof in so far as it con-
cludes: ''That the water flowing into the MeN a ugh ton 
Gulch above the last mentioned dam at the Southeast 
corner of the West 40 acre tract is owned by the plain-
tiffs.'' · That such conclusions of law is without support 
in either the evidence or the findings of fact, ~and the 
same is contrary to law. ( R. 71). 
POINT SIX 
The trial court erred in making its decree in the fol~ 
lowing particulars : 
a. That the trial court erred in its Decree in the 
third paragraph thereof insofar as its .decrees: ''That 
the natural depression (the McNaughton Gulch) which 
runs in a Southeasterly direction across the above de-
scribed lands as is set forth fully in the Findings of 
Fact, is by nature a dry wash; that the waters ~accumulat­
ing therein, which are the subject matter of this dis-
pute, have . their origin in . irrigated lands adjacent to 
said wash, and .that said waters are seepage or waste 
waters which find their .way through percolation into said 
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natural 'Yash or depression ""hich is commonly known ·as 
the McNaughton Gulch." That such is without support 
in the evidence. ( R. 72-73) 
b. That the trial court erred in its .Decree in the 
fourth paragraph thereof insofar as it decrees: "That 
the plaintiffs are the owners of the right to use all of 
the "\Vater accumulating in the McNaughton. Gulch. be-
tween the diversion dam located on property now owned 
by Roy Carroll immediately West of the above described 
MeN aught on property as described in the Findings of 
Fact, and the McNaughton Dam which' is located im-
mediately North of the Southeast corner of the vVest 40 
acre tract described ·above, which said MeN a ugh ton Dam 
is more fully described in the Findings of Fact, and also 
to use the 'Yater from the Gulch on the MeN aughton 
land located to the North of the MeN a ugh ton Gulch, and 
that none of the defendants ha.ve any right to, use any 
of the said water, and plaintiffs' title to said water is 
hereby quieted, and the defendants and each of them 
is hereby enjoined from using said water or attempting 
to use the same, or from claiming any interest of any 
kind therein." That such decree is without support in 
either the evidence of the Findings of Fact and is con-
trary to law. (R. 73 
c. That the trial court erred in its Decree in the 
fifth paragraph thereof wherein the court deereea: 
"That the plaintiff, John E. MeN aughton, is the owner 
of the right to use all the water thus accumulating in 
the channel between the Roy Carrol Dam and· the Me-
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above, and are decreed to have the right to maintain a 
tight diverting dam across the channel of the M-cNaugh-
ton Gulch at the point where the McNaughton Dam is 
now maintained immediately North of the Southeast 
corner of the West 40 acre tract described above, and 
to divert and use all of said water from the McNaughton 
Gulch at that or any other point on the M-cNaughton 
property above the said McN'aughton Dam.'' That such 
decree is without support in either the evidence of the 
Findings of Fact and is contrary to law. (R. 73) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ·ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING AND DISPOSING 
OF THE CASE ON THE THEORY THAT THE WATERS IN 
VOLVED WERE DIFFUSED, WASTE, SEEPAGE AND PER-
COLATING WATERS AND AS SUCH NOT SUBJECT TO AP-
PROPRIATION. 
While the written memorandum decision made by 
the court below may not take the place of or serve to 
modify or contradict the Findings of Fact, yet such opin-
ion may he looked to to interpret and explain the Find-
ings. Christensen v. Nelson, 73 Utah 603, 613; 276 Pac. 
645. It will be seen from a reading of the court's memo-
randum opinion that the trial -court based its writ-
ten memorandum opinion solely upon the assumption 
that the waters involved in this controversy were dif-
fused, percolating and seepage waters ~and as such not 
subject to ·appropriation. It is also made to appear 
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that all of the parties to this proceeding directed their 
evidence to the use that had been made of. the water 
since before 1900. In making this statement we have not 
overlook~d the fact that John A. Gardner testified to 
the effect that in 1885 the McNaughton Gulch was dry. 
(T. :24) nir. Gardner, ho,vever, does not state what time 
of the year it "\Yas "\vhen he observed the gulch was dry, 
what kind of a year it was as to precipitation or any 
other fact that would enable one to determine whether 
the condition of the gulch at the time it was observed 
by ~Ir. Gardner was a temporary or a permanent con-
dition. In its written opinion the court below recognized 
the fact that it was deciding the case on a theory other 
than that upon which the case was tried. In justification 
for doing so the court cites the cases of· Gladhill et al v. 
Malottf, 58 Utah 105, 197 Pac. 725 and Nelson et al v. 
Sanpete County 40 Utah 5·60; 123 Pac. 334. 
It is the established law that a party in an action 
may not on appeal change the theory upon which a case 
is tried in the trial court. Holman et al v. c·hristensen, 
73 Utah 389; 274 Pac. 457. The rule precluding a party 
from changing the theory of his case in the appellate 
court is recognized by the cases cited by the court below. 
Doubtless the principal basis for the rule is that if a 
case is tried upon one theory and then upon a review by 
the appellate court a different theory is urged, such 
change in theory may well deprive a party to the action 
of the opportunity of producing evidence of controlling 
importance when viewed in the light of the theory ad-
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14 
vanced for the first time in the appellate court. If a 
party to an action is deprived of an opportunity to pro-
duce evidence bearing upon the theory finally adopted 
by the court in disposing of the action, it would make no 
difference whether such deprivation was brought ahout 
by a change of theory ·after trial, in the trial court or 
the :appellate court. 
Thus, this case was tried on the theory that the 
water in controversy had been public waters subject to 
appropriation and the evidence of all the parties was 
directed to the -question of their respective priorities in 
the use of such waters. There was no occasion to offer 
any evidence touching the question of the w.ater in con-
troversy being subject to appropriation during the course 
of the trial because there was no issue or controversy 
about that matter. The defendants were not called upon 
during the course of the trial to offer such evidence as 
they had in support of their claim that the water in dis-
pute was such water as might be appropriated where as 
here throughout the trial no one contented that such 
waters were not or had not been subject to appropriation. 
For the court to decide the case on a theory entirely dif-
ferent from that to which all the ,evidence was directed 
deprived the defendants of a fair trial. Who ·can s~ay 
that if the defendants had been advised that there was 
some question -about the waters in dispute being subject 
to appropriation, the defendants could not have estab-
lished such fact beyond controversy. 
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l\loreover, such evidence as was · received in this 
case shows that the waters in dispute were public water~ 
subject to appropriation at the time the same. were. ap-
propriated by the defendants. The evidence shows and 
the trial court foun~ that the formation of the McNaugh-
ton Gulch "~as not within the memory of man, heading 
at the top of a large drainage area, and .from its nature, 
course and direction, it is logical to conclude that it was 
caused only from storms and seasonal run-off of melting 
snows. ( R. 48) The evidence is that the ·gulch is still 
subjected to floods in times of torrential storms. (Tr. 76, 
100) It may be inquired: "How else has any natural 
"~ater- course ever been formed~'' In its memorandum 
decision. the trial court from the evidence and testimony 
accurately described the gulch as it crosses plaintiffs' 
lands, varying from 3 to some 12 to 14 feet in depth 
·and from 3 to 5 rods in width, with precipitous banks of 
clay and sand which are constantly sluffing off, tending 
to widen the Gulch. Lands on both sides of the gulch 
slope towards it so that the natural drainage ·of con-
siderable acreage is toward the gulch in addition to it 
forming a collection area for sub-surface waters. (R. 
49) The court also noted, as was also described by.vari-
ous witness for both parti~s, that oall along the sides and 
bottom of the gulch through plaintiffs' property, water 
is seeping, oozing into the stream channel. That in sev-
eral places definite springs exist and that grasses, water 
cress, and willows grow all along the gulch. (R. 30) 
How ·else can one more accurately describe the form~tion, 
history and existence of a natural water course~ It is 
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unfortunate that there is no evidence as to the head, 
end, length, type of water and other characteristics 
which would be helpful in this determination, but this 
absence can only be attributed to the theory upon which 
the trial was had and the trial courts denial of defen-
dants' motion for a new trial which was timely made 
after learning that the court ha.d disregarded the trial 
theory and made its decision upon the theory that the 
waters of the gulch were not public waters. 
There is no evidence to show that the volume of 
water flowing in McNaughton Gulch has increased con-
stantly with the increase of cultivation and irrigation 
in that area. To the contrary, the evidence is that since 
before 1900 the stream flow has been constant-the defen-
dants testified without contradiction that since that time 
they and their predecessors in interest have had suffi-
cient water to irrigate their lands, and further that the 
flow of the gulch has varied only with the flow of other 
creeks and streams resulting from wet and dry seasons; 
and that only in 1948 did they ever notice any decrease 
in the flow of the gulch which aroused their suspicions. 
An investigation disclosed the reason of the unprece-
dented variation of the flow was that plaintiff had di-
verted the water from the gulch. (Tr. 276, 293, 351, 352) 
The record shows that McNaughton gulch was dry one 
season but that was during the irrga.ting season and dur-
ing a year when the entire area was dry and in need of 
water. (Tr. 351) That the flow is constant throughout 
the year indicates that the flow does not vary with the 
application of irrigation water. (Tr. 61, 63, 322) It is 
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a kno"rn fact that no one can accurately determine the 
amount of the flow of ThieN a ugh ton gulch which could be 
attributed to rain fall, snow, seepage, or percolation frorn 
irrigation. In all instances the water would be diffused 
" ... aters until it formed the flow of the gulch. There is 
no evidence that surface waste water runs into the gulch 
at any point. 
If this were a controversy -over the waters percolat-
ing through the ground of the plaintiffs ibefore the same 
emerged from the soil to join the flow of McNaughton 
Gulch, then the trial court might consider such a question. 
However, to bring these waters, after forming such a 
constant flow in a channel of a water course as described 
by the evidence presented by this case, under the defini· 
tion of diffused and percolating waters in Wrathall v. 
Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 Pac. (2d) 755, is something not 
contemplated by the decision in that case. The definition 
in that case cited by the trial court is as follows: "I use 
the term (percolating waters) as diffused waters in lands 
privately -owned, percolating or seeping through the 
ground, moving by gravity in any or every direction 
along a line of least resistance, not forming any part of 
a stream or other hody of water either surface or s:Ub-
terranean, and, as far as known, not contributing or 
tributary to a flow of any defined stream or body of 
water. In other words, mere diffused waters in privately 
owned lands, not flowing in any defined, or known stream, 
either surface or subterranean, or not forming a part 
of a body of water, either surface or subterranean." 
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If the facts descr~bed by the evidence in this case 
preclude the users of such waters from establishing a 
right to the use of the same, many well-established 
wat~r rights along .water courses similar to the Mc-
Naughton gulch :wjll be upset. There was introduced and 
received in evidence in this case Civil No. 960, Uintah 
County, Ma;ntle et al v. Eaton et al wherein the court 
found that McNaughton gulch is a natural water course 
and adjudicated t~e water among the defendants and 
their predecessors in interest. That decree was received 
in evidence · (T-r. 301). ,but the same is not marked as 
an Exhibit. 
The waters of nearly every creek or stream of the 
State of Utah at one time have been diffused and per-
colating waters, but once they have emerged from the 
ground and collected in the form a stream in a. natural 
water course, they no longer can be s.aid to come under 
the definition of percolating waters 'as used in the Wrat-
hall case. 
The question of what are and what are not percolat-
ing and surface waters has frequently been before the 
courts. So far as we have been 1able to find there has not 
been a Utah case where water naturally flowing in a well 
defined natural channel has been held not subject to ap-
propriation. It has :been uniformly held so far as we are 
advised that water which finds its way into a natural 
channel to augment the flow thereof becomes a part of 
the stream. Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 
Vol. 2, page 2164, Sec. 1194 and cases there cited. 
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In Golobe v. Shute 22 Ariz 280, 196 Pac. 1024, the 
court said '~ ,,~ e find no difficulty in holding that a ravine 
or "·ash is a natural stream or watercourse, in the sense 
of the law, ""'"here the rains or snows falling -on the ad-
jacent hills run down the ravine or wash in a well-de-
fined channel at irregular intervals.'' 
In Jaqu.ez Ditch Co. v. Garcia, 17 N.Mex. 160, 124 
Pac. 891, the court held that an arroyo is not prevented 
from being a natural water course merely because water 
did not run in it during the entire year, and pointed out 
that surface water originating from rains can form 
watercourses under some circumstances, that the flow 
need not be continuous, and classified the arroyo as a 
watercourse. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon dealt with the matter 
in Simmons v. Winters, 21 Oregon 35, 27 Pac. 7, wherein 
it held that a stream flow is a water course if it originates 
from rain and melting snow descending through long, 
deep depressions, upon lower lands, carves out a dis-
tinct channel which unmistakably bears the impress of 
frequent waterflow, and has flowed from time immemo-
rial. 
In Wyoming, the Supreme court has dealt with this 
problem in two cases. The first arose in 1935 in Wyoming 
v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172, 44 Pac. 2d 1005, and was concerned 
with a draw extending for only a short distance which 
had no well defined banks or stream channel, but was 
rather a typical grassy swale which could be crossed 
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in a car at almost any point, was dry most of the time, 
but drained rainfall from a small watershed of about 
300 acres, bore no evidence of washing and did not pre-
sent the casual appearance of a watercourse. The court 
held that the waters were not those of a stream, but 
were ordinary diffused surface waters which could be 
used by the landowner without first appropriating them 
under the State law. The second case was decided in 
1940, B'inning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 Pac. 2d 54, in 
which the same court held that a draw having no regular 
stream channel and no banks, and having no great flow 
of water except upon one ·occasion, was not a natural 
stream subject to appropriation under such conditions 
existing in 1906. Those ·conditions, however, were dif-
ferentiated from the situation as of the year 1936, 30 
years later, at which time the continued seepage from 
surrounding lands had formed a regular, natural stream 
at the lower end of the draw, the testimony showing that 
at that point there were then definite channels and banks. 
While the supreme court was not altogether satisfied on 
the point, it was held that the water running in the 
stream was, commencing at least with 1936, subject to 
~appropriation, subject to the right of the owner of land 
on which the seepage arose to make beneficial use of the 
seepage water upon such land. Numerous other cases and 
authorities will be found and discussed in the foregoing 
cases from Wyoming. 
In Hoefs v. Short, 114 Tex 501, 273 S.W. 785, 40 
A.L.R. 833, the court held Barilla Creek to be a water-
course, adopting the princip·al that the existence of bed, 
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banks, and pern1anent source of supply is merely evi-
dentiary that a stream ean be used for irrigation or water 
rig-ht purposes, and that once the fact of utility has 
been conceded or established the stream is one to which 
'Yater rights attach, regardless of variations from the 
ideal stream of physiographers and meterologists. The 
court adopted the view that the distinguishing character-
istics of a stream is the fact that it will furntish the 'ad-. 
vantages usually attendant upon a stream of water. 
On the other hand, the waters have been generally 
held to be diffused surface waters, where the drainage 
area was so extremely small, or the flow so small or 
such short duration, or the channel so short, that the 
situation as a whole, esp~cially when compared with 
acknowledged streams in the general area in which found, 
negatived in the mind of the court its idea of what a 
,) 
water course really is. Gibbs v. Williams 25 Kans. 214; 
Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R., 165 U.S. 593; Turner v. 
Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W. 2d 221; Sangu·i-
netti v. Pock, 136 Calif. 46·6, 69 Pac. 98. 
It is to be noted from 'all these cases that there i'3. 
a general lack of uniformity as to source of supply. 
Some of the decisions speak of a permanent source while 
others speak of a definite source. The latter is more ac-
curate in the arid Western States. There is no difficulty 
in calling a spring a definite source and the flow is gen-
erally either continuous or recurs with a measure of reg-
ularity, depending on the season. During dry seasons and 
periods of drought any stream may diminish and in our 
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own state it is not uncommon for them to· cease to flow 
during one or more seasons or for the latter part of any 
ir~iga ting season. 
It is also evident from the cases that the tendency 
has been, as it should be, to hold that a water course 
exists, whatever may be the source of the water, where 
a sizable stream was found to flow in a waterworn chan-
nel of considerable length for several months or even a 
few weeks of each year, or that was otherwise character-
istic of stream flow in the general area, and that was 
susceptible of substantially valuable and bene~cial use. 
In the light of the foregoing cases certainly the 
waters of MeN a ugh ton Gulch should not be classified 
as diffuse_d, seepage and percolating waters. This water 
is concentrated in a waterworn channel, the banks of 
which are well defined and have been from time im-
memorial. The evidence is uncontradicted that some-
where near 1900 the predecessors in interest of the de-
fendants raced to see who could first make an appropria-
tion from McNaughton Gulch, (Tr. 11, 12) .and that ever 
since the first appropriation all the defendants and their 
pr,edecessors in interest have had and have used suffi-
cient water to irrigate their lands. (Tr. 66, 67, 125, 316, 
108). 
It should be noted that the plaintiff admitted that 
the water stock they now own in the Ashley Upper Canal 
Co. and the Ashley Reservoir Company, which repre-
sent a full water right for his acreage under the practice 
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of the community, was obtained by the. beneficial use of 
such waters upon the very land he now claims to have 
used the 'vaters of McNaughton Gulch. (Tr. 210, 211, 
212, 213) Plaintiff also testified that of recent years he 
has leased his canal ·and reservoir water. (Tr. 154) 
The facts of the case now before the court remove 
it from the scope and intent of Garns v. Robbins, 41 Utah 
260, 125 Pac. 867, Ann. Cas. 1915 C 1159 and ~oberts 
v. Gribble, 43 Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014. Those ·cases held 
that percolating water resulting from irrigation of one's 
own land may be recovered and used by the owner be-
fore it leaves his land. There is no evidence in this case 
that the source of the water in controversy is from the 
application of water to plaintiffs' land. Neither is this a 
controversy over the relative rights of adjoining land-
owners to construct drains or otherwise recapture dif-
fused, seepage, percolating waters. This is a contro-
versy over waters which have naturally found their 
way into McNaughton Gulch from over a large drainage 
area and have formed a constant, considerable flow. 
Under the rule of Rasmussen v. Moroni lrrig.ation 
Co., 56 Utah 140, 189 Pac. 572, and Richlands Irrigation 
Co. v. Westview Irrigation ·Co., 96 Utah 403, 80 Pac. 
(2d) 458, the plaintiffs should not interfere with the 
seepage and diffused waters which would otherwise 
reach the stream. And certainly such plaintiffs can-
not appropriate the stream itself. The instant case is 
not concerned with a recapture of waste and seep·age 
waters. The plaintiff is not contending that he has 
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made such a recapture. This controversy is over waters 
that have by natural means found their way into a 
water course and merged into a stream. 
In the case of Smithfield 'West Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. et al, 113 Utah 356, 
195 Pac. (2d) 249, decided in 1948, this court stated, 
"It is well established * * * * that waters diverted 
from a natural source, applied to irrigation and recap-
tured before they escape from the original appropri-
ator's control, still belong to the original appropriator." 
However, in this case, the plaintiffs are not seeking 
to recapture water appropriated by them, but are 
seeking to control waters flowing from springs which 
have formed into a definite stream. The court further 
states in the Smithfield case that even if an original 
appropriator recaptures his water he may again reuse 
them only if he has a beneficial use for such waters. 
It is the defendants' contention that McNaughton 
Gulch is and always has been a natural water course 
and the waters thereof public waters subject to appro-
priation. However, if this court should find the waters 
of said gulch to be waste, seepage, diffused and per-
colating waters the -defendants should still be awarded 
the waters under the doctrine of reasonable and bene-
ficial use. 
The case of Riordan v. W estw·ood, Utah, 203 Pac. 
(2d) 922, decided in 1949 and numerous other cases as 
well as U.C.A., 1943, 100-1-3 fixes "beneficial use" as 
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the measure and limit of all rights to the use of water 
in this state. The adjudicated cases show the courts 
of this state have uniformly attempted to give effect 
to the statute regardless of the source of the water 
and to require the beneficial use of all waters in this 
arid region. The trend of the courts as well as the 
Legislature is to,vard an enlargement of waters which 
are subject to appropriation. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT. ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
DEFENDANTS TO REOPEN THE CASE OR GRANT A 
NEW TRIAL. 
Under Point one heretofore discussed, we have 
briefly referred to the refusal of the court below to 
permit the defendants to reopen the case or grant a 
new trial. In addition to what is there said, it may 
further be observed that a party to an action may be 
as effectively deprived of a fair trial by a trial court 
deciding a case on a different theory than that upon 
which it was tried ~as if an appellate court should do 
the same thing. The difference is that if a trial court 
commits such error there is available to the aggrieved 
party a motion to reopen the case or for a new trial 
and thus p·ermit the reception of addition evidence 
touching any material matters that were not investi-
gated when the case was tried because the parties 
proceeded on the assumption that there was no con-
troversy about such matters. Certain it is that when 
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a case is tried on one t~eory and. decided . on an 
entirely different theory 'Yhich requires different evi-
dence the injustice that may flow from ~.uch practice 
is the same whether followed i~ a trial court or in ~n 
appellate court in the ·~bsence of the aggrieved party 
being given an opportunity to. be heard on the theory 
upon which the case is. decided. The trial court has 
at its disposal the means of affording the party who 
deems himself prejudiced by a change of theory by the 
court after the evidence is in of either leave to reopen 
the case or grant a new trial and thereby afford the 
parties· an opportunity to 'be· fully heard upon the 
theory which the court deems the proper 'th.eqry. The 
functions of reopening a case or the granting of a 
new trial is to correct just such a. miscarriage of justice. 
POINT THREE 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF J. P. RUDY 
The testimony of J. P. Rudy _was taken on August 
17, 1948 apparently pursuant to Chapter 52 .of Title 
104, U.C.A., 1943. Amo:n,g other matters it is there 
provided- ''The Judge must also designate in his 
order the clerk of the court to whom the deposition 
must be returned when taken". It will be noted that the 
order of the court in this case ·contains no such provision. 
It will also he observed that the order permitting 
the taking of the deposition of J. P. Rudy requires 
that the notice of the hearing be given ten days before 
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such hearing. There is no competent evidence as to 
when or \Yhere service of the notice of the taking of 
the testimony of J. P. Rudy was served upon the de-
fendants. It is also made to appear that the so-called 
notice and deposition were at the time of the trial 
taken from the files in a criminal case. ( Trs. 225-6) 
The deposition of Mr. Rudy and the proceedings had 
in connection with the taking of the same is enclosed 
in ~an envelope attached to the Judgment Roll. 
POINT FOUR 
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT IN A NUMBER OF PARTICULARS. 
Because the court decided the case on •a theory 
other than that upon which it was tried, the evidence 
is very meager as to some of the questions which the 
court below apparently deemed of controlling impor-. 
tance. Thus the court found it is finding numbered 
four that said gulch (McNaughton Gulch) in its natural 
condition prior to 1885 was dry and no w·ater flowed 
therein." (R. 67) The only evidence we can find in 
the record in support of the finding just quoted is that 
of John A. Gardner. He testified that the McNaughton 
Gulch ''was a dry gulch'' in 1885. (Tr. 4) Mr. Gardner 
further testified that a dam was placed in the gulch 
in about 1886 on the Carroll property which is 'a mile 
or maybe not more than a half mile west of the 
Carroll property. (Tr. 5) The fact that a dam was 
constructed in the gulch in 1886 would 'Seem to be 
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conclusive pToof that there was water in ·the gulch 
during that year. Indeed, .the fact that there was a 
gulch with high banks and a bed, as the evidence with-
out ·conflict shows, is most convincing that at some 
time in the past there was water therein. The very 
existence of the Gulch could not well have been brought 
about by any other means than a stream of water. 
Numerous witnesses testified that dams were placed 
in the MeN a ugh ton Gulch prior to 1900 and that the 
defendants, except during dry years, were well sup-
plied with water from that source for the irrigation 
of their lands. Among 1Such witnesses •are : W. Simpson 
Ross (Tr. 316); Ed Tyzack testified that his Father, 
along in about 1900, got water to irrigate his farm 
from the McNaughton Gulch, that he got fish and 
muskrats from the gulch, and went in swimming above 
a dam in the gulch. (Tr. 18, 22) As we understand, 
fish require water to live in and mu1skrats do not live 
in dry gulches. Asher Merkley testified that wat.er 
runs in the McNaughton Gulch most of the irrigation 
season, and that he had never seen it dry (Tr. 61) 
There is other evidence to the same effect but as we 
understand, no claim i1s or could be made that there 
has not been water flowing in the Gulch since 1886. 
Not being so no useful purpose will be served by direct-
ing the attention of the Court to such other evidence 
touching the fact that the Gulch was not dry :after 1885. 
There is no direct evidence to support that part 
of findings numbered 5 wherein it is found that seep-
age and warste waters found their way :by percolation, 
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seepage and surface run off into the MeN aughton Gulch. 
The most that can be said in support of such finding 
is that when the adjacent lands were irrigated p-robably 
some of such "\Vater found its way into the Gulch. 
Even if that is so it by no mean's follows ~hat the 
waters of the gulch were not subject to appropri~ation. 
As we have heretofore in this brief pointed out the 
authorities are, so far as we are able to ascertain, 
uniform to the effect that waters which find their 
way into a natural water course become a part of the 
stream and the appropriators of the waters of such 
stream are entitled to the use of the water so augment-
ing the stream the same as the other waters thereof. 
The court will also look in vain to find any direct 
evidence to support the finding to the effect that the 
amount of water that finds its way into the McNaughton 
Gulch varies from day to day and from season to sea-
son depending upon the irrigation practices prevailing 
on the adjacent lands. Such finding is based solely 
upon an inference and is at variance with the direct 
testimony of such witnesses as Asher Merkley (Tr. 61 
to 67), Edward Hoeft (Tr. 100 to 106) Ernest John-
son (Tr. 126) and W. Simpson Ross (Tr. 322). 
The foregoing evidence also refutes that part of 
finding No. 6 wherein the court found that the volume 
of seepage or waste water flowing into the McNaughton 
Gulch h~a:s increased with the increased irrigation with-
in its drainage area, but the flow at its lowest ebb is 
of a negligible amount. 
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So ~lso is there an absence of evidence to support 
that part of finding nu~bered .. '6 wherein .. it is found 
that the water thus finding its way into the McNaughton 
Gulch has . its origin ori~nally in the .AJ~hley upper 
canal. The fact is and the evidence . sho:ws that th~ 
Gulch was in existence from a . time whereof the 
memory of man runneth not to the contra~y and the 
Ashley Canal is of recent origil_l. 
In their assignment of errors attacking the trial 
court findings, the· defendants have subdivided. such 
assignment. We do not fi~d any evidence. whatsoeve-r 
which supports a number of the' findings so attacked 
and therefore nothing more can be said as to' such 
assignments, that is to say, if there is no evidence 
" , I , 
to support a finding, not~ing mor~ can be said as to 
why the tri~al .court erred in making the finding . so 
L ' I ' > I 
attacked. 
Moreover, in the light of the tr:lal courts ·conclu-
·~ion that the waters in controversy were not subject 'to 
appropriation, . no useful pu~pose can :be :served by the 
findings of fact other th~n or in addition to the findings 
of such facts . as are necessary to establish the. con-
clusion that the water is not :subject to appropriation. 
In other words if the defendants or their predecessors 
in interest have not· acquired a right to the waters: 
of McNaughton Gulch they can not be heard to complain 
because the plaintiff has impounded the same and 
deprived the defendants of the u~se thereof. 
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POINT FIVE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING ITS CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW. 
It will be noted that in its Conclusions of Law the 
court below awarded to the plaintiffs not only the water 
which finds its way into the McNaughton Gulch on 
plaintiffs' land, but also all water that finds its way 
into the McNaughton Gulch above plaintiffs' l·and. Not 
only that, but the court concludes that the ·defendants 
should be enjoined from attempting to divert any 
waters that find their way into the McNaughton Gulch 
above plaintiffs' land. Thus, if any of the defendants· 
own or should acquire a tract of land above plaintiffs' 
land through which the McNaughton Gulch extends 
they should, according to the conclusions of law of the 
trial court, be enjoined from using the same. Obviously 
if the defendants by the use made by them of the 
waters of McNaughton Gulch cannot acquire any right 
to any waters that ~arise on plaintiffs' land, by the 
same token the plaintiffs' may not by use acquire any 
right to the use of water that arises on lands not 
owned by them. 
POINT SIX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AND ENTERING 
ITS DECREE. 
The trial court also by its decree awarded to the 
pl·aintiffs not only the water which fin~ds its way into 
the McNaughton Gulch on plaintiffs' land, but also to 
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all water which finds its way into the McNaughton 
Gulch at or above the Carroll property. Here again 
by its decree the court refuses to award water which 
throughout the years has, under claim of right, been 
beneficially used by the defendants on their lands 
because, as the court finds, the same arises on plain-
tiffs' lands and at the same time awards to the pl~ain­
tiffs, without competent proof of beneficial use, water 
which has a similar source of supply on lands owned 
by persons other than the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs 
may acquire by mere use a right to water finding its 
way into the MeN a ugh ton Gulch on lands not owned by 
them, we can conceive of no reason why the same 
right should not be accorded the defendants. 
c·o N C L U SI·O N 
It is the contention of the Defendants that the 
trial court committed the following fundamental errors 
in the trial and disposition of this ease. Such errors 
being: 
1. That the defendants were denied a fair trial 
because the court below decided and disposed of the 
case on the theory that the waters involved were dif-
fused, waste, seepage and percolating waters while all 
of the p~arties tried the case on the theory that the 
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waters involved have been public waters and as such 
subject to appropriation and the same have been ap-
propriated by the defendants. 
2. That the evidence shows that the water~s in 
dispute were public waters, subject to appropri~ation 
and the same have been lawfully appropriated by the 
defendants. 
3. That if it should be held that the evidence 
fails to show that the waters in dispute were subject 
to appropriation, the court erred in refusing the request 
of the defendants to reopen the case or to gr,ant a 
new trial to the dependants and thereby afford the 
defendants an opportunity to offer further proof that 
the waters in dispute were such waters as might law-
fully be appropriated. 
4. That if the waters 1n controversy are such 
waters as are subject to appropriation neither the evi-
dence, the findings of fact, nor the conclusions of law 
are sufficient to sustain the decree awarding the water 
here involved to the plaintiffs. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that the water in 
dispute or the major part thereof be awarded to the 
defendants or if that may not be done that the cause 
be remanded to the court below with the direction to 
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such court to. grant a new trial or P~!mit the reopening 
of the case for the reception of such fu;rther evidence 
as the parties may ~desire to offer. 
R.es.pectfully submitted, 
) . . ' . 
'COLTON AND HAMMOND 
and 
ELIAS HANSEN 
) . ~ •. . 
t• I I r 
Attorn.eys for ~efendants. 
and Appellants 
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rATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss )UNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Elias Hansen, hereby certify that 
~I am one of the attorneys for the defendant in 
mtt 
the case of McNaughton, et al vs. Eaton, et al, 
Case No. 7646; that on June 14, 1951 I deposited 
in the United States Post Office, postage pre-
paid thereon, two copies of the Brief which is 
hereto attached and that said Brief so deposited 
in the Post Office was addressed to Edward W. 
Clyde, attorney at law, 351 South State Street,, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
1·::-u.,:· Subscribed and sworn to before me this -~  I 
day of June, 1951. ~ 
//Jt4d0 cj~~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Residing in Salt Lake City, Ut 
Expires: 5=-¥-.r.r 
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